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“One morning, as Gregor Samsa awoke from restless dreams, he found himself
transformed in his bed into a monstrous vermin.” Thus begins one of the
modern classics of fiction, Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis. In his story, Kafka
creates a fictional reality in which the protagonist struggles to come to grips
with the fact that he has turned into an oversized beetle. What kind of reality is
that? There are various ways of answering that question, but I am specifically
interested in two of them. The first is that Kafka’s story creates a reality of sorts
in the minds of his readers; the second is that the reality in question exists
somehow between the author and his readership.
In his target article, Emar Maier claims that we must choose between these
two views, and opts for the first, which he calls “psychologistic.” But why must
we choose? The story of Gregor Samsa’s plight is at once a form of interaction
between Kafka and his readers, and one that affects the minds of the latter. Why
rule out the possibility that it creates some sort of reality on the social as well as
the psychological plane? No reason at all, as far as I can see. So let’s adopt an
ecumenical stance, and in that spirit consider fiction from an interpersonal
perspective. Doing so is of considerable interest in itself, but will also help to
contextualize and clarify Maier’s project, which takes a personal point of view,
namely, that of the reader.
This ecumenical approach recommends itself more generally. To give just
one example, suppose Jack says: “I’ll do the dishes.” On the one hand, we may
construe his utterance as expressing an intention on his part; this is the
personal, psychologistic perspective. On the other hand, the same speech act
may be viewed from a social stance, as committing Jack to a certain course of
action. Both stances capture something worthwhile capturing, and neither
seems reducible to the other: insincere promises are as binding as sincere
ones, and speech acts can bring about unintended commitments. The social
aspect of speech acts deserves our attention as much as the psychological
aspect does, and this holds not only for fictional statements, but across the
illocutionary board.
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In modern times, storytelling has mostly become a drawn-out process, in
which production and consumption are separated by long stretches of time,
sometimes even millennia. Yet, fiction remains a form of communication, i.e.
social interaction, and that’s how I propose to consider it here. Following a
variegated tradition that includes Peirce (1934), Brandom (1994), Walton and
Krabbe (1995), and Krifka (2014), among others, I view communication as a way
of negotiating commitments. Promising is the paradigm. If Jack promises Jill to
walk the dog, his speech act causes him to become committed to Jill to make it
true that he will walk the dog. Due to Jack’s committing himself in this way, Jill
becomes entitled to act on the premise that Jack will walk the dog, and thus
Jack’s commitment helps Jill to coordinate her actions with Jack’s. That’s what
commitments are for: they are coordination devices.
Though promising is the poster child for most commitment-based accounts,
the idea that utterances create commitments for the speaker applies equally to
other speech act types. Most importantly, for our current purposes, it applies to
statements, too. If Jill tells Jack that she loves endive, for instance, then she
constrains her future actions in all sorts of ways, since her utterance entitles Jack
to expect that Jill will manifest her fondness of endive if and when appropriate,
will abstain from anti-endive behaviour and so on.
This view on communication is geared to action in more than one way. Not
only is an utterance an action in its own right, it also serves to constrain the
speaker’s future actions, and thus enable action coordination between speaker
and addressee. An important class of these future actions are themselves speech
acts. Jack’s promise, for instance, not only commits him to walk the dog, but
also to not wonder whether he will walk the dog, to be willing to confirm that he
will do so, and so on. In short, an utterance always implies a pattern of actions
the speaker commits himself to, and part of that pattern will consist of speech
acts he is expected to perform, if appropriate, or to refrain from performing.
As Bratman (1987) has emphasized, commitments must be persistent in
order to serve their coordinative purpose. If Jack commits himself at 10 a.m. to
walk the dog at noon, he remains so committed at least until noon. This is not to
say that his commitment is immutable: there are all sorts of circumstances that
may absolve him of his obligation to walk the dog at noon. It will be understood,
for instance, that Jack’s commitment becomes void if either he or the dog breaks
a leg. Commitments are persistent, but only by default.
Commitment is a three-place relation between two individuals, a and b, and a
propositional content ’, which I read as “a is committed to b to act in accordance
with ’,” without implying that ’ is true. Hence, commitments may be seen as
propositional attitudes, though as long as a≠ b, they are social relationships rather
than mental states. (If a= b, a is committed to himself to act in accordance with ’).
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Such private commitments may result from self-directed speech acts, or “self talk”;
they lie outside our current purview. See Geurts 2016 for discussion.)
As a rule, commitments are supposed to be shared: if a commits himself to b
to act in accordance with ’, then ceteris paribus b is expected to reciprocate a’s
commitment, and will do so, ceteris paribus. Joint commitment may be defined
in terms of shared commitment, as follows: a and b have a joint commitment to
act in accordance with ’ iff they:
(1) share a commitment to act in accordance with ’,
(2) share a commitment to act in accordance with (1),
(3) share a commitment to act in accordance with (2),
and so on.
Within a commitment-based framework, joint commitment suggests itself as a
natural candidate for defining the notion of common ground, which is widely
agreed to be a cornerstone of communication, if not social interaction at large
(Stalnaker 1973, 2002; Clark 1996). As a first stab, we may equate the common
ground between interlocutors a and b, at a given time point t, with a and b’s joint
commitments at t. As a and b toss all manner of speech acts at one another, their
common ground expands, while at the same time serving as the basis on which a
and b perform their speech acts. For instance, if Jack promises to do the dishes,
and Jill volunteers to help, then Jill’s offer is predicated on Jack’s commitment,
which just entered their common ground.
This way of defining common ground is closely related to more established
definitions in terms of mutual belief or mutual knowledge (Lewis 1969; Fagin
et al. 1995; Stalnaker 2002), but there is an important difference, which has to do
with the fact that commitment doesn’t entail belief. If it is mutual belief (or
knowledge) between a and b that ’ is the case, then a and b must believe that ’.
Contrariwise, a and b can be jointly committed to ’ without believing ’ to be
true. Hence, on a commitment-based definition, the notion of common ground is
doxastically neutral.
To explain why this may be a desirable feature, consider the following
scenario. Due to heavy rainfall, the river will burst its banks within the next
48 hours. Given its situation, it is inevitable that the local school will be flooded,
and therefore the school director and her staff are convening to draw up an
emergency plan. If we call this scenario S1, scenario S2 is a variant on S1, in
which the school is safely situated on a hilltop, and in no danger of being
flooded either now or ever. In S2, director and staff are planning for that
contingency by way of a team-building exercise; they are engaged in pretend
play. Despite the differences between S1 and S2, it doesn’t seem too far-fetched
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to imagine that the team’s deliberations are the same, word by word, in both
scenarios, and that in each case they agree to raise furniture to a higher level,
block drains, turn off water, gas, and electricity and so on. That is to say, in both
scenarios, the team enter into the same commitments for the duration of the
planning session. Specifically, for as long as their meeting lasts, they are
committed to the truth of the proposition that the school will be flooded. But
whereas in S2 their commitments expire with the end of the planning session, in
S1 they are effectuated afterwards. Hence, whereas in S1 commitment entails
belief, in S2 it doesn’t.
There is a stark contrast between S1 and S2, which, drawing inspiration from
Maier’s distinction between regular and fictional statements, we might express
by distinguishing between regular commitments and merely fictional ones. Very
roughly, the suggestion is that, unlike their regular siblings, fictional commit-
ments only hold provisionally. There are various ways of fleshing out this idea,
but in any event the upshot will be that fictional commitments cause a split in
the common ground. For, speakers who enter into fictional commitments do not
thereby suspend all their regular commitments, but only some. In S2, the inter-
locutors’ commitments are largely the same as in S1, except for the ones hanging
on the counterfactual assumption that the school will be flooded. The space of
fictional commitments in S2 is demarcated from the regular commitment space,
but the two spaces are not shut off from one another: apart from its location, the
school is the same in both, as are the pupils and teachers, the laws of physics,
last year’s inflation rate, and so on. In brief, regular and fictional commitment
spaces are distinct, but strongly connected, especially by virtue of the fact that
they share inhabitants.
Whereas the school team’s pretend play in S2 is predominantly realistic,
children’s pretend play is further removed from reality, and literary fiction
allows itself still greater degrees of freedom, sometimes to the point of logical
inconsistency (Priest 2005). Literary fiction is special also in that it reduces turn
taking to a minimum: the author makes all his commitments in advance, and
reading is an act of consummation in which the reader comes to share the
writer’s commitments, one after the other. Still, whether literary or not, fiction
is a social practice, a form of interaction between speakers and hearers, or
writers and their readers, which is not fundamentally different from other
types of discourse.
This approach to fiction is quite different from Maier’s. Though our points of
departure coincide in that we agree that an account of fiction must be embedded
in a theory of speech acts, Maier’s treatment of fictional speech acts is rather
perfunctory. He begins by stipulating that fictional statements are “pretend
assertions” rather than “regular” ones:
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Unlike regular assertions, fictional statements do not express information about the way
the world is but rather invite the reader to imagine a certain state of affairs. (p. 4)
Adopting Walton’s (1990) phrase, Maier characterizes fictional statements as
“prescriptions to imagine,” but instead of embarking on an in-depth analysis
of this species of speech act, Maier concentrates his attention on how they affect
the mind of the addressee:
Intuitively, interpreting a fictional text is just not a matter of updating some abstract
intersubjective common ground between speaker/writer and hearer/reader. To make
sense of the philosophically compelling intuition that fictional statements are prescriptions
to imagine, we need a framework that captures what happens in the mind of the reader
when she interprets a text. (p. 6)
On the face of it, there isn’t much that our accounts have in common. To
mention only some of our differences, whereas Maier presupposes that fictional
statements are a special kind of speech act, I would argue that they are
continuous with regular statements. Also pace Maier, I claim that fiction is
very much a matter of building common ground between speakers and writers,
on the one hand, and their audiences, on the other. But most importantly,
whereas I see fiction as a form of social interaction, Maier’s principal concern
is with the effects of fiction on its consumers’ mental representations.
These are substantial differences, for sure, but most of them are overcome
by embracing the ecumenical view I suggested at the beginning, and viewing
Maier’s enterprise and my own as complementary rather than contradictory. We
can either view communication as social interaction or home in on the psychol-
ogy of speakers and hearers, and there is no need to suppose that the two
projects are irreconcilable (cf. Geurts and Rubio-Fernández 2015). Indeed, if both
projects are worth pursuing, it behoves us to show how they can be reconciled.
Specifically, we need to understand how the two stances hang together, and
how explanatory labour is to be divided between them. Clearly, answering these
questions is too tall an order for the present occasion (not to mention the present
author), and in the remainder of this note I will confine myself to drawing out
only some of the ramifications of the ecumenical view.
Maier’s starting point is that a work of fiction invites its readership to
imagine the world as being so-and-so. Like hopes and beliefs, imaginings are
mental states, and they are connected with other mental states, which may
include mental states of the same type; i.e. imaginings may be connected with
each other. For instance, while reading Kafka’s story, I imagine a reality in
which a sales representative named “Gregor Samsa” finds himself transformed
into a beetle. Pondering Gregor Samsa’s sad fate, I imagine a happier course of
Fictional Commitments 57
Brought to you by | Radboud University Nijmegen
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/26/19 2:12 PM
events in which the same man turned into a world-class DJ instead. Thus, I
arrive at two imaginings, the first of which was prompted by Kafka’s story, while
the second is “parasitical” on the first, as Maier puts it. With some minor
variations, Maier would represent this situation as follows:
(1)
img
x
name(x,Gregor)
turn.into.beetle(x)
img
turn.into.dj(x)
Citing Kamp (2015) and myself (1999) in support, Maier argues that such struc-
tures must be viewed as mental representations. That’s the view I used to hold,
too, but never entirely without misgivings. To explain my worry, and at the same
time illustrate the generality of the issue, consider that hackneyed example:
(2) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
Within the framework of Kamp’s (1981) discourse representation theory (DRT),
the most natural reading of this sentence is represented as follows:
(3) x y
farmer(x)
donkey(y)
own(x, y)
⇒
beat(x, y)
The structure of this representation is identical to that of (1) in two key respects:
it separates its content into two boxes, which are connected by discourse
referents that are introduced in one box and reused in the other. The main
challenge of a dynamic semantics like DRT is to ensure that structures with these
features are interpreted in a way that captures their intuitive meaning. Kamp
(1981) showed how to do this for the original version of DRT; Maier does the
same for a rather more expressive version.
It can hardly be denied that, like (1), the structure in (3) may be viewed as a
mental representation, but the claim under discussion is that itmust be viewed that
way in order to account for the anaphora in (2). What has always worried me about
this claim is that it seems to be too strong. Even if an utterance of a sentence like (2)
affects the hearer’s mental state, and even if it makes sense to ask how the hearer’s
mental state is affected, it seemed puzzling to me that we should have to refer to
mental representations in order to account for the anaphoric links between “a
farmer” and “a donkey,” on the one hand, and the pronouns “he” and “it,” on the
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other. Armed with the insight that communication can and must be understood on
more than one level, I believe I can justify my puzzlement.
Briefly, the argument goes as follows. The principal problem that DRT is
designed to solve is to capture the content distributed over separate compart-
ments connected by recurrent discourse referents. But as we have seen, commit-
ment spaces present us with the exact same problem, and if the DRT framework
is essentially mentalistic, that is, if structures like (1) and (3) must be viewed as
mental representations, then that precludes a unified treatment of anaphora
across the social and psychological levels; which is unsatisfactory, because the
problem appears to be the same for both levels.
Let me unpack this argument with the help of another classic example:
(4) Pedro owns a donkey. He beats it.
In this case, the problem is to explain the anaphoric links connecting “Pedro”
with “he” and “a donkey” with “it,” and I maintain that that problem presents
itself both on the psychological and on the social level. In psychological terms,
the hearer first has to deal with the speaker’s belief in the proposition that Pedro
owns a donkey, and then with her belief in the proposition that x beats y, where
x and y are somehow connected to the content of the speaker’s first belief. In
social terms, the speaker commits herself first to the truth of the proposition that
Pedro owns a donkey, and then to the truth of the proposition that x beats y,
where x and y are somehow connected to the content of her first commitment.
Since the two sets of facts are structurally identical, and we are dealing with
propositional attitudes in both cases, one should expect the same account to
apply to both. The claim that DRT’s representational structures are essentially
psychological stands in the way of such a unified account.
It appears, therefore, that the standard interpretation of DRT is overly con-
crete. It may seem natural to interpret its structures as mental representations, and
on the psychological level such a construal may be defensible, but on the social
level it isn’t. A more abstract interpretation is called for, which allows for the
possibility that the same structures are realized at both levels. Speakers and
writers alter representations in the minds of their addressees, but at the same
time their linguistic output alters social relationships between themselves and
their audience, and those relationships have representational structure, too.
Moreover, the representations emerging at the psychological and the social levels
are similar both contentwise and structurally, even if their substrates are funda-
mentally different. This is what permits us to say that there is a sense in which
Gregor Samsa exists in the minds of Kafka’s readers, but there is also a sense in
which the selfsame Gregor Samsa exists between Kafka and his readers.
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